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Treatment for the Cuban Dream

The lease may be man in this country of some day getting Cuba back out of the hands of Fidel Castro and into the hands of friendly, non-communist leaders is presently well shattered. There is no chance of gluing it together. Neither is there any reason not to dream a new and more practical dream.

The beginning point would be exactly what is happening now, assuming present courses are not turned into a new direction. There are four areas for examination:

The C. A. is the first. It is now assumed to have had a fairly large finger in the Castro overthrow movement, which was badly mismanaged whoever was bossing it, and is reported to have sadly missed the mood of the Cuban people with respect to joining any revolutionary attempt. This is not the first time the C. I. A. has come under questioning eyes and minds. It is our super-secret agency; it spends a great deal of money but for obvious reasons it is brought into no wellpublicized investigations. But now it will have to be probed; it has been charged with too many failures in the last couple of years. It may come out of it all clear, but some examination is mandatory.

The state department is the second. State department careerists are now generally conceded to have failed miserably (by American standards) in their judgment of Fidel Castro. An investigation here is a little like locking the stable door after the horse has been stolen, but it is nevertheless essential, since the right kind of an inquiry into some of the state department personnel might save other embarrassments in the future.

The Cuban revolutionary leadershin is the third. The Cubans in exile in this country have done far too much wrangling among themselves; we know now that many were placing hopes of personal gain and glory ahead of national survival and there is grave doubt about the background of the individual whose establishment as "leader" was with the administration's (C. I. A., or state department) approval. Holmes Alexander says frankly we had our money on the wrong man, one the people of Cuba would not follow. There is possibly a large part of the trouble.

But we are inclined to think not. Some poor intelligence work, if that is proved, would have hurt us; some poor state department advice, already proved, has hurt us; the established leadership of the new revolution was questionable to say the least, but there is one more factor that probably overrides the others. The fourth factor is simply that the Cuban people are no worse off now than they have been for many generations and with certain variations, Castro is just "some more of the same." In one sense he may be better for some Cubans — those who

were actually given land under the land reform program that was under way for a while.

It is significant that Castro's own revolution had no popular support until he started making promises of a better life for the common man whose life, under Batista, was not particularly good. It would seem logical to think that the Cuban people would respond only to the same appeal in the future and none, in the case of this revolution, was made.

Not all the story of Cuba has been told. Not all the facts are known. But the American dream for the future of Cuba received some pretty tough treatment and a new dream had better make a great deal more sense.